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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) gives this Court 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues on appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court commit error in granting summary-
judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, ruling that Plaintiff 
failed to provide any admissible evidence of ownership of a 
pipeline which Plaintiff claims was wrongfully used by Defendants? 
2. Should the Plaintiff be allowed, first by a motion to 
reconsider after the entry of summary judgment and then on appeal, 
to change its theories, submit new documents and claim rights under 
an agreement signed after the claimed damages occurred? 
3. Are other owners of the pipeline indispensable parties to 
a claim of trespass of the pipeline? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, the Court follows 
a correctness standard. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharm., Inc., 
2003 UT 43, Hl4, 79 P.3d 922. 
A motion to reconsider is not recognized by the court. A trial 
court ruling on a motion to reconsider is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. Radakovich v. Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454, ^[5, 
147 P.3d 1195; Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins., 2007 UT 37, Kl5, 163 
P.3d 615. 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. See Addendum A. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See Addendum B. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59. See Addendum C. 
Utah R. Evid. 1002. 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in 
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of this State or by Statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeking trespass damages for using a pipeline 
to transport small quantities of natural gas. The court found that 
Plaintiff had provided no proof of the allegations in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. Plaintiff's complaint, filed in February 2005, claimed 
damages in trespass beginning in 2001 for Defendants' use of the 
pipeline based on a claim that the Plaintiff was the sole owner of 
the pipeline.1 
The Complaint alleges in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 as 
follows: 
7. The subject of this lawsuit is the unauthorized 
use of approximately 4 miles of a natural gas pipeline 
and easement, which runs in an east/west direction and 
That allegation in the complaint has never been amended. 
However, Plaintiff has taken various other positions in this case, 
including admitting that others owned the pipeline and now, on 
appeal, claiming a possessory interest in the pipeline. 
2 
has a total length of approximately 8 miles, located in 
the North Bonanza field, in Section 36, Township 7 South, 
Range 24 East, Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 25 
East, Sections 6 and 7, Township 8 South, Range 25 East, 
and Sections 12,13, 23, 24, 26, and 27, Township 8 South, 
Range 24 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, Uintah County, 
Utah (hereinafter the "Pipeline"). 
8. Plaintiff is the current owner of the Pipeline. 
9. During the times of the unauthorized use of the 
Pipeline, which unauthorized use is the subject of this 
litigation, the Pipeline was owned by either the 
Plaintiff or by Mr. William C. Gilmore, who resides in 
Houston, Texas, or by other business entities owned or 
controlled by Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Gilmore and the other 
business entities mentioned in the previous sentence are 
collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiff's 
Predecessors in Interest" or as "Plaintiff's 
Predecessors." 
10. Mr. Gilmore is the president and controlling 
shareholder of the Plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff has sole right to pursue, and the 
sole ownership of, the claims hereby presented by 
assignment from Mr. Gilmore and the other business 
entities referenced in the previous paragraph. 
(R. 11-12) . 
Mr. Gilmore testified in his deposition2 that Bonanza Gas 
built and owned the pipeline at issue in this matter. (Gilmore Dep. 
at 95, 96, R. 479). Mr. Gilmore further attested that Bonanza Gas 
was either a partnership with seven or eight partners or a 
For the Court's convenience, pages from Mr. Gilmore's 
deposition, submitted to the trial court prior to summary judgment 
and referred to in this brief, are attached in the addendum. Page 
18 of the (summary judgment) oral argument transcript is also 
attached. That page contains quotations from pages 14 5 and 14 6 of 
Mr. Gilmore's deposition testimony. Following citations to these 
pages, their location in the record is specified, and references to 
other supporting materials in the record are supplied. 
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corporation with multiple shareholders. (Gilmore Dep. at 10-11, 13, 
15, 93-94, R. 223, 225, 227-28, 479).3 In addition, Mr. Gilmore 
averred that Ted Collins Jr. (Gilmore Dep. at 114, 151-52, R. 332-
334), Herbert E. Ware, Jr. and Houston Exploration Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Houston Exploration") owned interests 
in the pipeline. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, 112, 114, 151-52, R. 331-
335) . In his deposition, Mr. Gilmore denied that Plaintiff 
represented the interests of Houston Exploration, Ted Collins Jr. 
and Herbert E. Ware, Jr. (Gilmore Dep. at 112, Transcript of oral 
argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 145-46, R. 335, 901). 
All Defendants denied the allegations that Plaintiff owned the 
pipeline at the time for which it claimed damages, or had the right 
to recover for use of the pipeline. (R. 17-18, 34-35, 43-45). In 
part, these denials were made because it was known that the 
pipeline, and other assets associated with it, had been the subject 
of a receivership involving Bonanza Gas, under which Ken 
Allen/Cochrane Resources had been appointed by the court to operate 
the pipeline, and that revenues gained from its operation had been 
used to pay expenses of operating the pipeline and repairs to it. 
(Gilmore Dep. at 85-87, 102, 152, R. 330-332, 480) . Mr. Gilmore, in 
his deposition, admitted that the pipeline had been operated by 
Cochrane Resources under court order. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, 102, 
3 
Documentation submitted by Plaintiff after the trial court 
granted the motion for summary judgment showed that Bonanza Gas was 
a Texas Corporation. (R. 584). 
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152, R. 330-332) . The documents provided by Plaintiff by attachment 
to its Motion to Reconsider show that Cochrane Resources paid the 
rental payments to the BLM on the pipeline right-of-way for the 
years 2002 through 2005. (R. 609-619). Bonanza Gas was billed for 
the BLM easement rental in 2001. (R. 604, 606-607). 
The defendants attempted to conduct discovery to determine 
what evidence existed to support Weststar's allegations that 
Weststar owned the pipeline at the time of the alleged trespass. 
Weststar was asked repeatedly for evidence supporting Weststar's 
allegations that it was the owner of the pipeline. The only 
information provided was Mr. Gilmore's claim that he became the 
owner of the pipeline by virtue of an unrecorded assignment from 
Bonanza Gas and then he transferred the interest to Weststar. 
(Gilmore Dep. at 33, R. 481, 358-365, 371, 417). Despite numerous 
requests and promises, Plaintiff never produced the "unrecorded 
assignment'' from Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore. In Appellant's brief, 
that position has changed to a claim that Mr. Gilmore obtained 
title to the pipeline by virtue of being a shareholder of Bonanza 
Gas. 
Weststar never provided any admissible evidence to support its 
allegations that Plaintiff had title to the pipeline and sole right 
to use the pipeline as alleged in its Complaint. All admissible 
evidence showed the pipeline was owned by Bonanza Gas, which was 
5 
not a party to the case. The trial court, therefore, granted 
summary judgment dismissing the complaint. (R. 533, 537). 
More than a month after the court granted summary judgment, 
Plaintiff filed its Motion to Reconsider, attempting to change its 
theories and attaching documents that it had never produced in 
discovery. (R. 668) . The motion and documents were not proper and, 
in addition, did not strengthen the Plaintiff's claim, but rather 
showed ownership of the pipeline by Bonanza Gas. The documents 
further showed that the pipeline was operated during the time in 
question by Cochrane Resources under the receivership order. The 
trial court denied the motion to reconsider. (R. 834). 
Course of Proceedings and Facts 
1. Weststar filed its Complaint on or about February 9, 
2005. Plaintiff's complaint sought damages for trespass, claiming 
sole ownership of the pipeline from 2001 to 2005. (R. 3-12). 
2. The pipeline is located on a BLM easement in Uintah 
County, Utah and is subject to the permit terms of the BLM. It is 
alleged that Defendants used 4 miles of the pipeline to transport 
small quantities of gas from Chevron and QEP to operate equipment 
on certain gas wells. (R. 10). 
3. The parties held a telephone attorneys' planning meeting 
on June 29, 2005. The Scheduling Order memorializing the deadlines 
in the Report of Attorneys' Planning Meeting was signed by the 
court on July 22, 2005. (R. 112). Under the discovery plan, the 
6 
parties were to submit their initial disclosures to each other by 
July 22, 2005, and complete fact discovery by October 31, 2005. (R. 
112) . 
4. All parties in the case, except Weststar, submitted their 
initial disclosures to all other parties by the July 22, 2005 
deadline. (R. 30-31, 39-40). Plaintiff never filed its initial 
disclosures until the court granted a motion to compel. (R. 13 5-
138) . 
5. The failure of Plaintiff to meet the deadline for initial 
disclosures marked the beginning of a pattern that lasted 
throughout this litigation, whereby Plaintiff failed to meet 
discovery deadlines, failed to provide documents and other 
information when requested by the other parties (and agreed to by 
Weststar) and otherwise failed to prosecute this action. 
6. After numerous attempts, the parties took the deposition 
of Plaintiff's president, Mr. Gilmore, on October 3, 2005. 
7. Gilmore testified, in his deposition, that he formed 
Bonanza Gas Company sometime in the early 1990s. (Gilmore Dep. at 
10-11, 13-16, R. 222-225, 227-228). Bonanza Gas obtained the 
easement for the pipeline from the BLM and owned, constructed and 
operated the pipeline. (R. 598). 
8. Gilmore testified that he had an unrecorded assignment of 
ownership of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas to himself personally, 
and an unrecorded assignment of ownership from himself to 
7 
Plaintiff. He and his attorney agreed to produce those documents to 
all counsel. He did provide a form Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases 
from himself to Weststar that might be construed to include a 
pipeline, but he never produced any assignment from Bonanza Gas. 
(Gilmore Dep. at 34, R. 220). 
9. Gilmore also testified that Weststar had assigned a fifty 
(50%) percent interest in the pipeline to Houston Exploration 
Company on March 26, 2004. (Gilmore Dep. at 112, R. 335). He 
further testified that two individuals with whom Gilmore has a long 
history of litigation, Ted Collins and Herbert Ware, Jr., each had 
a longstanding 8.33% ownership interest in the pipeline. (Gilmore 
Dep. at 114, R. 334). Weststar did not claim to represent the 
interests of Houston Exploration, Collins or Ware. (Transcript of 
oral argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 145-4 6, R. 901). 
10. Gilmore further admitted that, from 2002 into 2005, the 
pipeline and other assets were operated by Cochrane Resources (one 
of the defendants) under a court order. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, R. 
331) . 
11. When Plaintiff failed to produce any admissible evidence 
of ownership of the pipeline, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment. The motions were briefed and the court held oral 
argument. 
12. The primary issue at oral argument and in the motions for 
summary judgment was Plaintiff's lack of any admissible evidence 
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that it, rather than Bonanza Gas, owned the pipeline. (Transcript 
of oral argument at 12, 48, 50, R. 901) . Plaintiff attached, to its 
memorandum in opposition to Cochrane Resources, Inc.'s summary 
judgment motion, a 1988 operating agreement between Gilmore Oil and 
Gas as operator and several nonoperating parties. (R. 453). 
Plaintiff, at oral argument, produced agreements between Plaintiff 
and Houston Exploration to which Defendants objected. (Transcript 
of oral argument at 30, R. 901) . Plaintiff argued that those 
documents gave Plaintiff title to the pipeline. It was pointed out 
that the 198 8 agreement predated the construction of the pipeline 
by 3 years, that Bonanza Gas was not a party to either agreement, 
that Mr. Gilmore had earlier testified that Bonanza operated the 
pipeline and that Gilmore Oil and Gas operated certain wells. 
(Gilmore Dep. at 11, R. 227, Transcript of oral argument at 25, R. 
901) . 
13. The court granted summary judgment, finding that 
Plaintiff had failed to provide any admissible evidence of 
ownership of the pipeline as alleged in the complaint. (R. 533, 
537) . 
14. More than a month after entry of the summary judgment, 
Plaintiff filed a document it titled Motion to Reconsider and 
attached numerous documents that it had failed to produce in 
discovery. Plaintiff alleged that the newly produced documents 
showed that Plaintiff owned the pipeline. (R. 668). 
9 
15. The trial court denied that motion. (R. 834). 
16. Plaintiff, on appeal, has changed its theory and no 
longer claims ownership based on the never produced unrecorded 
assignment claimed by Mr. Gilmore, but instead alleges that Gilmore 
acquired the pipeline by operation of law as a shareholder of 
Bonanza or that Plaintiff had a possessory right to the pipeline 
based on the operating agreement and a participation agreement 
between Plaintiff and Houston Exploration. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Weststar had numerous requests and opportunities to provide 
proof of the ownership of the pipeline as alleged in the complaint. 
All evidence and the documents it provided show the pipeline was 
owned by Bonanza Gas Company, Inc. Weststar's president claimed 
that he had documentary proof (an unrecorded assignment) and 
repeatedly promised to supply it. He failed to do so and then, at 
oral argument, claimed a right to the pipeline under a 1988 
operating agreement and the Houston Exploration financing 
documents. Now, on appeal, Plaintiff's position has changed again, 
claiming either that Mr. Gilmore acquired the pipeline by operation 
of law, alleging that Bonanza was dissolved, or that Plaintiff has 
a possessory right under the terms of the agreements with Houston 
Exploration.4 Those theories were never raised before the trial 
4 
Plaintiff, in its brief, also improperly attempts to include 
parts of the deposition transcript that were not before the trial 
10 
court on the motion for summary judgment and never ruled on by the 
court below. 
Regardless of the shifting of Plaintiff's positions, the 
record stands uncontradicted that Bonanza Gas owns the pipeline. 
There has been no admissible evidence showing any transfer of that 
ownership. For several years, 2 002-20 05, operation of that pipeline 
was transferred to Cochrane Resources under a court order. Not 
until 2006 did the BLM authorize Plaintiff to operate the line, 
which date was well after any claimed damages occurred. 
The additional documents submitted by Weststar in its Motion 
to Reconsider, after the motions for summary judgment had been 
granted, should not be considered on appeal. However, even if they 
are, they establish that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION BY ADDING NEW DOCUMENTS AND NEW THEORIES 
ON APPEAL, 
Weststar apparently agrees that the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment was correct based on the record at the time of the 
ruling, because Weststar is now attempting to overturn the trial 
court's decision by first seeking to add new documents (that were 
never produced in discovery but rather through an improper motion 
court. See Appellant's brief at footnote 9. 
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to reconsider) to the record, and then by arguing that it did not 
have to show ownership but only a "possessory interest" in the 
pipeline.5 This theory was not pled and was not raised nor argued 
in connection with the motions for summary judgment in the court 
below. 
Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and are not recognized by the courts. Gillett v. Price, 
2006 UT 24, %1, 135 P.3d 861; Radakovich, 2006 UT App 454, %%5, 13; 
Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, f 15. The trial court has discretion on 
whether to consider a motion to reconsider and the trial court's 
ruling will only be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. 
Id. at 1J16. Issues not before the court when it rules on a motion 
for summary judgment are waived and may not be raised later by 
motions to reconsider or on appeal. Eldridae v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT 
App 243, t 33, 166 P.3d 639; Hanover v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753 
(Utah 1977); Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 838 
(Utah 1980). 
In addition, it is established law that one cannot put forth 
"new" evidence after entry of the judgment unless that evidence is 
"newly discovered" and the proponent "could not, with reasonable 
diligence discover it prior to oral argument." Utah R. Civ. P. 
5 
Right to possess generally arises from ownership of the 
property. Qwest v. Utah Telecomm. Open Structure Agency, No. 2:05-
CV-00471 (D. Utah July 18, 2006) at 12 (attached in addendum); 
Butler v. Pollard, 800 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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59(a)(4); Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992). 
Furthermore, 
when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, that 
is not modified on cross-examination, [the party] may not 
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his [or her] own 
affidavit which contradicts the evidence from the 
deposition, unless [the party] can provide an explanation 
of the discrepancy. A contrary rule would undermine the 
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out 
sham issues of fact. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983); Gaboury v. 
Ireland Rd. Graco Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. 1983). 
Weststar's complaint alleged, and its position below was, that 
it owned the pipeline through an unrecorded and unproduced 
assignment from Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore, who in turn assigned 
ownership to Weststar Exploration Company.6 (R. 3). Weststar should 
not be allowed, for the first time on appeal, to submit records 
from the BLM, by attaching them to an improper motion to reconsider 
and then to change its position to claim that it had a possessory 
6 
The assignment from Gilmore to Weststar has its own set of 
problems. The document was apparently signed in December 2003 and 
then recorded in the county recorder's office on March 31, 2004. 
(R. 3 65) . In an attempt to bootstrap an argument of legitimacy back 
to the date of the alleged injury in the complaint, the assignment 
states that, although dated 2003 and recorded in 2004, it is 
effective January 1, 2000. (R. 363-365). Thus, through this 
assignment, Weststar would have the Court believe that the pipeline 
was assigned to Weststar before Weststar was even created as a 
corporation. (Gilmore Dep. at 93, R. 479) . The Nevada corporate 
records show Weststar was not incorporated until August 9, 2000. A 
conveyance to a nonexistent entity is a nullity. Young v. Young, 
1999 UT 38, 1[22, 9 7 9 p- 2 d 338-
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right to the pipeline as operator, under an operating agreement, 
rather than ownership as alleged in its complaint. 
A. PLAINTIFF PROVIDED NO EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
ALLEGATION THAT IT OWNED THE PIPELINE. 
The motions for summary judgment were based on Weststar's 
claim that it owned the pipeline, as alleged in the complaint and 
as claimed by Mr. Gilmore in his deposition. Despite numerous 
requests by Defendants and promises by Plaintiff, Plaintiff never 
produced the unrecorded assignment Mr. Gilmore claimed he had in 
his office showing the transfer of title from Bonanza Gas. If such 
a document exists, Plaintiff needed only to produce the same in 
response to the motions for summary judgment. 
When Weststar filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motions for Summary Judgment, it attached to Mr. Gilmore7s 
affidavit a form Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases from Mr. Gilmore 
to Weststar, (R. 365) , and attached to one of its memoranda a Model 
Form Operating Agreement, dated June 22, 198 8, between Gilmore Oil 
and Gas as operator and W. Brett Smith, C.O. Ted Collins, Harry 
Phillips, Jr., Herbert E. Ware, Jr., Eddy Refining Company, Charles 
Parker and Lowe Petroleum Company as non operators.7 (R. 431). 
Neither Bonanza Gas nor Weststar was a party to that agreement. (R. 
7 
Gilmore in his deposition testified that Gilmore Oil and Gas 
operated certain wells and that Bonanza owned and operated the 
pipeline. (Gilmore Dep. at 11, R. 227.) 
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423-453). At the oral argument on the summary judgment motions, 
Plaintiff delivered a Participation Agreement, dated March 1, 2004, 
between Weststar and Houston Exploration and a Model Form Operating 
Agreement between Weststar and Houston Exploration. None of those 
documents shows any transfer of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas nor 
do they give to Weststar any ownership or possessory rights. 
The 198 8 operating agreement was dated three years prior to 
the construction of the pipeline, Bonanza Gas was not a party to 
the agreement and Mr. Gilmore testified that Gilmore Oil and Gas 
operated the wells and Bonanza Gas operated the pipeline. The 
documents involving Houston Exploration were part of the financing 
between Weststar and Houston Exploration but involved no transfer 
of ownership from Bonanza Gas. 
B. THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ALSO DID NOT TRANSFER ANY OF BONANZA GAS'S 
INTEREST, BUT RATHER SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO 
RIGHT UNDER THE BLM PROCEDURES TO OPERATE THE LINE 
UNTIL 2006. 
After the court granted summary judgment, Weststar tried to 
improve its argument by attaching documents to a motion titled 
Motion for Reconsideration. The new documents attached to that 
motion included BLM receipts showing Bonanza Gas and Cochrane 
Resources being the operators and paying the lease payments on the 
easement during the time period in question, (R. 601-628), the 
right-of-way permit issued to Bonanza Gas in 1991 for the pipeline, 
(R. 597-598), documents submitted by Bonanza Gas to obtain the 
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right-of-way, (R. 586-595), Certificate of Incorporation showing 
Bonanza Gas was incorporated in Texas in December 1990, (R. 584), 
a Decision of the BLM approving an assignment to Weststar from 
Bonanza Gas of the right-of-way on March 13, 2006, (R. 579), and a 
letter from the BLM to Plaintiff dated June 8, 2004. (R. 547). 
This new evidence (NOT "newly discovered evidence") had been 
seen neither by the court nor by any of the defendants before the 
Motion for Reconsideration (and not for the lack of asking). None 
of the defendants had the opportunity to examine Mr. Gilmore with 
regard to these documents. In addition, they were not used in 
support of Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, nor were they provided, at the very least, at 
oral argument so that the court could consider them as part of 
Weststar's arguments in opposition to Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. The documents should not be considered by this 
Court. Those documents should have been "discovered and produced" 
prior to the motions for summary judgment as required by the 
scheduling order. (R. 112). 
Even if the Court considers these documents, they do not 
support Plaintiff's claim, and, in fact, contradict Mr. Gilmore's 
testimony at his deposition, that Weststar was the owner of the 
pipeline. The documents show that Bonanza Gas had the BLM permit 
for the right-of-way, that Bonanza Gas and Cochrane Resources 
operated the pipeline from 2001 to 2005, and that Plaintiff was 
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told in the June 8, 2004 letter that an assignment and subsequent 
approval by the BLM were required to allow Plaintiff to operate the 
pipeline. That approval was not given until March 2006, well after 
any claim for damages.8 (See June 2004 and March 2006 letters 
attached in addendum.) 
C. GILMORE'S ASSERTION IN HIS AFFIDAVIT THAT BONANZA 
GAS ASSIGNED THE PIPELINE TO HIM IS NOT ADMISSIBLE, 
AND APPARENTLY ABANDONED, BASED ON THE NEW 
ARGUMENTS. 
The only remaining claim by Plaintiff to support its position 
is the statement in Mr. Gilmore's affidavit that he had an 
unrecorded assignment of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas. Mr. Gilmore 
never presented the document establishing the assignment, despite 
numerous promises to do so. It has become apparent that no such 
assignment exists, as he has now changed his position on that claim 
and is relying on other documents that were attached to the motion 
to reconsider. Gilmore's affidavit statement violates Rule 1002 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Additionally, the statement is barred 
by Utah law because it involves an alleged assignment of a real 
property interest that must be in writing to meet the statute of 
frauds. The statement is not admissible as evidence and should not 
be considered. Mountain W. Surgical Ctr. v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 
2007 UT 92, 592 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 
8 
The BLM Decision references an assignment from Bonanza Gas to 
Plaintiff but no such assignment was provided in the additional 
documents. 
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The court correctly granted the motions for summary judgment, 
because Weststar either could not, or declined to, provide evidence 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact establishing its 
ownership of the pipeline at the time the court ruled on the 
motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff's belated attempts to cure 
that problem evince only that any right Plaintiff had to operate, 
possess or use the pipeline did not begin until March 2006, when 
the BLM approved Plaintiff as the operator. 
POINT II 
THE DOCUMENTS BETWEEN HOUSTON EXPLORATION AND WESTSTAR 
FROM 2 005 DO NOT CREATE A POSSESSORY RIGHT TO AN INTEREST 
IN THE PIPELINE, SINCE THE PIPELINE WAS OWNED BY BONANZA 
GAS, NOT WESTSTAR. 
Bonanza Gas built the pipeline in question in 1991. Bonanza 
Gas was a Texas corporation. It apparently had seven or eight 
shareholders. (Gilmore Dep. at 93-94, R. 479). At the trial court, 
Plaintiff, through its president, claimed that the chain of title 
from Bonanza Gas to Weststar consisted of an unrecorded, unproduced 
and apparently nonexistent assignment signed by Mr. Gilmore on 
behalf of Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore. (Gilmore Dep. at 34, 95, R. 
220, 479) . None of the other seven or eight shareholders in Bonanza 
Gas is a party to the alleged assignment to Mr. Gilmore. (Gilmore 
Dep. at 10-11, 13, 15, 94, 96, R. 223, 225, 227-228, 479). 
According to Mr. Gilmore, the date of this alleged unrecorded 
assignment is sometime in 2005, the same year as the filing of this 
lawsuit. (Gilmore Dep. at 95, R. 4 79). This unproduced assignment 
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was made after the damages are alleged (in the complaint) to have 
occurred. 
Since that assignment does not exist or has not been supplied, 
Plaintiff claims that it has a right to bring this lawsuit because 
it has a right to possession in, rather than ownership of, the 
pipeline. This alleged right to possession is predicated on a 
belatedly produced Participation Agreement in which it purported to 
sell an interest in the pipeline to Houston Exploration, and an 
Operating Agreement between Weststar and Houston Exploration making 
Weststar the operator. Plaintiff makes that claim, but neither 
provides anything evidencing a transfer of title or possession from 
Bonanza Gas nor points to anything in the documents to support the 
claim. 
Plaintiff's theory appears to be that a person can sell an 
interest in a pipeline which he does not own, and then enter into 
an agreement with the buyer giving him, the non-owner seller, the 
right to possess it. Indeed, these transactions were completed 
while the buyer's president claims that other parties owned 
interests in the pipeline, and those parties are not signatories to 
either agreement. One cannot give oneself rights one does not have 
by purportedly conveying such non-existent rights to another and 
then acquiring them back from the other. Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P. 2d 
1044, 1046 (Utah 1987); Julian v. Peterson, 966 P.2d 878 (Ut. Ct. 
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App. 1998); Am. Vending Serv. Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
POINT III 
WESTSTAR'S NEW CLAIM THAT GILMORE RECEIVED TITLE TO THE 
PIPELINE BY VIRTUE OF THE DISSOLUTION OF BONANZA GAS BY 
OPERATION OF THE LAW IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND 
IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW REGARDING CORPORATE 
DISSOLUTION. 
Apparently conceding that there is no assignment from Bonanza 
Gas to Mr. Gilmore, Plaintiff for the first time on appeal argues 
that Mr. Gilmore obtained title to the pipeline by virtue of the 
dissolution of Bonanza Gas by operation of law, citing Texas 
statute and cases for the proposition that the assets of a 
dissolved company belong to the shareholders. Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that Bonanza was dissolved, nor is there information 
as to the number of shareholders. In addition, Weststar omits 
reference to the law that, when there is a dissolution of a 
company, creditors and taxes must be satisfied before shareholders 
have any right to the assets of the dissolved company. 
In other words, after any dissolution, there is a liquidation 
of the corporate assets in which the debts are paid according to 
their rights and priorities. If, and only if, assets remain 
available after all corporate liabilities are paid, assets are then 
distributed to shareholders according to their rights and 
priorities. The distribution of assets to shareholders is evidenced 
by conveyances appropriate to the type of asset. Further, all 
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shareholders are distributed assets based on their number of 
shares. Gilmore apparently owned only 8.33% of the shares of 
Bonanza Gas. (Gilmore Dep. at 10-11, R. 227-228). Even the Texas 
case cited by Weststar in support of its argument is a case 
involving a deed conveying assets of a dissolved corporation, and 
demonstrates that, until the liquidation takes place and there is 
a distribution of assets by conveyance, it is unknown whether and 
which assets go to which shareholders of a dissolved corporation. 
Until the liquidation and the distribution by conveyance, the 
assets remain with record title in the corporation. Since Weststar 
produced no evidence explaining if and how the assets of Bonanza 
Gas were distributed and there was no claim before the trial court 
of any such liquidation, the trial court correctly ruled that 
neither Gilmore nor Weststar owned the pipeline. 
POINT IV 
WESTSTAR'S NEW POSSESSORY CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS (i.e., PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 
AND OPERATING AGREEMENT AND BLM RECORDS) ON WHICH THOSE 
CLAIMS ARE BASED. 
While Weststar failed to present evidence to support its 
allegations that it is the sole owner of the pipeline or to 
contradict the documents it produced showing others to be owners 
and has changed its argument, that new argument regarding 
possession still does not defeat the granting of summary judgment 
against it. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that 
Plaintiff's new claims are accurate and that the defects in the 
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chain of title do not thwart Plaintiff's claims, and the Court 
further overlooks that Plaintiff's argument is based on evidence 
that was available but not produced at the time of the original 
briefing, not newly discovered evidence, Defendants are still 
entitled to summary judgment. The newly produced Operating 
Agreement does not support Plaintiff's claim. 
Weststar's claim of a right of possession to bring this action 
by virtue of being the operator under the operating agreement with 
Houston Exploration Company is not supported by the language of 
that agreement. The agreement provides that the "Operator shall not 
be deemed or hold itself out as the agent of the Non-Operator with 
authority to bind them to any obligation or liability assumed or 
incurred by Operator as to any third party." (Article V Operating 
Agreement, R. 7 82). 
The operator under this agreement is Weststar. The only non-
operator to sign the agreement is Houston Exploration Company. A 
reading of the operating agreement does not reveal any language 
authorizing the operator to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the 
parties to the agreement, much less can it provide authority to 
bring an action for non-parties such as Ted Collins and H. Ware. 
The narrow authorization for lawsuits mentioned in the 
operating agreement pertains to lawsuits giving the operator 
authority to 
settle any single uninsured third party damage claim or 
suit arising from operations hereunder if the expenditure 
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does not exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and if 
the payment is complete settlement on such claim or suit. 
If the amount required for settlement exceeds the above 
amount ($10,000.00), the parties hereto shall assume and 
take over the further handling of the claim or suit 
unless such authority is delegated to operator. 
(Article X Operating Agreement, R. 772). 
First, the lawsuit before the Court does not arise from the 
operations "hereunder" (the operations authorized by the operating 
agreement). Second, the lawsuit is not a third party uninsured 
claim. Third, the lawsuit seeks to recover more than Ten Thousand 
Dollars. Finally, the alleged claim for damages involves claimed 
actions for years before the operating agreement was in existence. 
Paragraphs 13 and 19 of Weststar's Complaint both allege that 
trespass started in 2001 and continued through 2004. The operating 
agreement does not support Plaintiff's claim. 
POINT V 
EVEN IF THE COURT FOUND THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN 
DISPUTE REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S OWNERSHIP/POSSESSION OF THE 
PIPELINE, THE CASE SHOULD STILL BE DISMISSED UNTIL THE 
PLAINTIFF ADDS ALL PARTIES CLAIMING OWNERSHIP/POSSESSION OF 
THE PIPELINE, 
One of the issues raised by the motions for summary judgment 
was a claim that the case should be dismissed unless all parties 
claiming ownership/possession of the pipeline were added as 
parties. (R. 287). If Bonanza Gas was not the owner of the 
pipeline, then there are eight to ten entities and individuals that 
claim an interest in this pipeline including Houston Exploration, 
Ted Collins, H. Ware, W. Brett Smith, Harry Phillips, Eddy Refining 
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Co., Charles Parker, Lowe Petroleum, and Peter Wareing. (R. 556). 
If Plaintiff somehow acquired an interest from Bonanza Gas, that 
interest is probably less than 6.25%.9 Plaintiff has provided 
nothing that illustrates it has the right to sue for trespass on 
behalf of all these parties, and, in fact, Mr. Gilmore, when 
questioned specifically about some of the parties, testified that 
Plaintiff was not representing those parties. (Gilmore Dep. at 112, 
152, Transcript of oral argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 14 5-
46, R. 332, 335, 901). If there has been a trespass and damage to 
the pipeline, those entities are entitled to their percentage of 
any damages and Defendants are at risk if all parties having a 
claim are not included in the case. 
The trial court ruled: 
[S]upposing the Plaintiff were able to prove even a 
partial ownership, the other putative co-owners of the 
pipeline should have been joined in this suit pursuant to 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to 
join these parties could also be grounds for dismissal, 
albeit without prejudice. However because the Plaintiff 
has not proven any ownership of the pipeline at all, this 
Court does not have to explore that avenue. 
(R. 533-536) . 
If this Court believes that Plaintiff has a right to seek 
damages and remands the case to the trial court, the Court should 
order Plaintiff to add as parties all entities that may have a 
9 
The 1988 Operating Agreement lists Gilmore7s interest as 
12.25% and one half of that interest was conveyed to Houston 
Exploration. 
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claim to ownership/possession of the pipeline. Utah R. Civ. P. 
19(a); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request 
that the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for 
Defendants be affirmed. 
Dated this JZ~^» day of January, 2008. 
McKEACHNIE LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Newfield Rocky Mountains, 
Inc. fka Inland Resources, Inc. and 
QEP Uinta Basin, Inc. 
By: A ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Gayle ^ . McKeachnie 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys/for Defendants/Appellees 
Cochrane/Respurces, Inc., and 
P & M Peftro]/eum Management, LLC. 
By: _ 
ClArk 
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I) June 8, 2004 and March 13, 2006 letters from the BLM 
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Tab A 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as 
a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he 
has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a 
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he 
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If the joinded party objects to venue and his joinder 
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a 
person as described in Subdivision (a) (l)-(2) hereof cannot be made 
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened 
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim 
for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any 
persons as described in Subdivision (a) (1)- (2) hereof who are not 
joined, and the reasons why they are not joined, 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23. 
TabB 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this 
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of 
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what 
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon 
the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
TabC 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may 
be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on 
a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
j udgment: 
(a) (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a) (2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the 
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special 
verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one 
of the jurors. 
(a) (3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(a) (4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a) (5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a) (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not 
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new 
trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall 
be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The 
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve 
opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 2 0 days either by the court for 
good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court on its own initiative may order a new trial for 
any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion 
for a new party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
thereof. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
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[JRT ^  ^ ^ IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTSTAR 
INC. , 
vs. 
COCHRANE 
EXPLORATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
RESOURCES, INC., ET AL. 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800069 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the court on the following motions 
for summary judgment: Defendant QEP' s "Motion for Summary Judg-
ment," dated February 13, 2006; P&M's "Motion for Summary Judg-
ment," dated February 27, 2006; Cochrane Resources' "Motion for 
Summary Judgment," dated February 27, 2006; and Newfield's "Mo-
tion Summary Judgment," dated March 03, 2006. The Court will 
address all of the motions for summary judgment in this one rul-
ing. The Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to QEP's motion 
was received March 20, 2006. the Plaintiff's other opposition 
memoranda were filed March 21, 2006. Reply memoranda were filed 
by: QEP on April 03, 2006; P&M on April 10, 2006; Cochrane Re-
sources on April 10, 2006; and Newfield on April 06, 2006. On 
July 12, 2006, the Court received oral argument in support of, 
and in opposition to, these motions. The Court, having reviewed 
the motions and the related memoranda, and having received a re-
quest for a decision, now rules upon the motions. 
I. The Motions for Summary Judgment 
The motions request that this Court grant summary judgment 
against the Plaintiff thereby dismissing all of the Plaintiff's 
claims against the Defendants pursuant to Rule 56 of Utah's 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants have presented several 
different arguments that support their motions for summary judg-
ment, however, this Court has only to consider one argument in 
determining whether to grant or deny the motions: Does the 
Plaintiff have a right to relief? The very core of any suit 
brought into court is the right to relief. An individual cannot 
maintain suit against someone for trespass when that individual 
cannot establish ownership of the property in question. Proof of 
ownership is prerequisite. In this case, the Court finds no in-
dication of Plaintiff's ownership. The Plaintiff has been given 
more than adequate time to produce evidence establishing his 
ownership of the pipeline in question, but has failed to do so 
even after repeated requests. It is for this reason that the 
Court will order that the Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
The Court notes that even if the Plaintiff were able to 
prove some sort of ownership of the pipeline, evidence submitted 
in the forms of affidavits and depositions go to show that the 
Plaintiff, at best, has only partial ownership of the pipeline. 
Supposing the Plaintiff were able to prove even partial owner-
ship, the other putative co-owners of the pipeline should have 
been joined in this suit pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Failure to join these parties could also be 
grounds for dismissal, albeit without prejudice. However, be-
cause the Plaintiff has not proven any ownership of the pipeline 
at all, this Court does not have to explore that avenue. 
II. Claims for Indemnification 
This suit contains multiple claims for indemnification. In 
this case, indemnification would only result in the event of a 
favorable ruling for the Plaintiff. Because the Court has de-
termined that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery on its 
causes of action, all claims related to indemnification are 
mooted. 
III. Defendant QEP's Claims 
In addition to its claim for indemnification, Defendant QEP 
has filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff for attorney fees 
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and filed a cross-claim for breach of contract against Defendant 
P&M and Defendant Newfield. 
A. Attorney Fees 
QEP argues that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, it 
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56 states that the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party if the court determines the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. In 
this case the court does not believe that the Plaintiff inten-
tionally brought a case that was without merit nor does the 
court believe that the case was not brought in good faith. It 
is this Court's opinion that the Plaintiff truly believed that 
it had a valid case, but was simply unable to provide the proof 
necessary to prove its argument. 
B. Breach of Contract 
QEP's cross-claim against P&M and Newfield for breach of 
contract is not before the Court at this time. For that reason, 
QEP's cross-claim survives this ruling and will be adjudicated 
at a later time. 
IV. Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will grant the Defen-
dants' respective motions for summary judgment and will deny De-
fendant QEP's motion for attorney fees. The Court directs De-
fendant QEP to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and 
submit it in accordance with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Dated this day of 2006, 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Jeffrey R. Oritt (Bar No. 2478) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff QEP Uinta Basin, Inc. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTSTAR EXPLORATION COMPANY, 
INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COCHRANE RESOURCES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; P & M PETROLEUM 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Colorado limited 
liability company; NEWFIELD ROCKY 
MOUNTAINS, INC., fka INLAND 
RESOURCES, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
QEP UINTA BASIN, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; and JOHN DOES 1-5 and 
MARY ROES 1-5, whose true names are 
unknown, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050800069 
Judge John R. Anderson 
On July 12, 2006, the Defendants brought on for hearing before the above-entitled court 
their various Motions for Summary Judgment. William Gilmore appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiff with Plaintiffs counsel, Daniel Sam. Defendant QEP Uinta Basin, Inc. ("QEP") was 
% h 
' \£^.. 
represented by its counsel, Jeff Oritt. Defendant Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc. fka Inland 
Resources, Inc. ("Newfield") was represented by its counsel, Gayle F. McKeachnie. Defendants 
Cochrane Resources, Inc. ("Cochrane") and P&M Petroleum Management, LLC ("P&M") were 
represented by their counsel, Clark B. Allred. All Defendants filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The Court, having read all memoranda supporting and opposing the Motions for 
Summary Judgment, having heard oral argument from all the parties, having reviewed the related 
memoranda and exhibits thereto, being fully advised in the premises herein, and good cause 
appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants are dismissed, as a matter of law and with 
prejudice, on the grounds that Plaintiff has produced to the court no evidence of ownership of the 
pipeline in question, notwithstanding having had more than adequate time to produce said 
evidence, and having failed to do so after repeated requests. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 
prove any right to the relief it seeks, as a matter of law. 
2. There are various cross-claims for indemnification among the Defendants. 
Because such claims require a favorable ruling for the Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs claims are being 
dismissed with this ruling, all such cross-claims related to indemnification (excepting QEP's 
claims for attorneys' fees and costs against Newfield and P&M) are mooted. 
3. Defendant QEP's counterclaim against Plaintiff for attorney's fees pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953, as amended) is denied on the grounds that it is the 
Court's opinion, based on the evidence before it, that Plaintiff truly believed that it had a valid 
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case, but was unable to provide the proof necessary to prove its argument. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff did not intentionally bring a case that was without merit, and that the case was not 
brought in bad faith. Accordingly, Defendant QEP's counterclaim for attorney's fees is 
dismissed. 
4. Defendant QEP has pending cross-claims for damages and reimbursement of 
attorneys' fees and costs against Defendants P&M and Newfield. In addition, Defendant 
Newfield has a pending third party indemnification claim against RMOC Holdings, LLC on 
Defendant QEP's claim. These claims are not before the Court at this time and accordingly 
survive this ruling. 
5. Defendant Cochrane has pending third party claims against Washington Mutual 
Bank and William Gilmore, which claims are not before the Court at this time and accordingly 
survive this ruling. 
6. Defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable costs incurred in this 
action against Plaintiff, as the prevailing parties. 
DATED this J / ^ d a y of August, 2006. / O 
/^Honorable John R. Anderson 
Eighth District Court Judge 
u 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTSTAR 
INC. , 
vs. 
COCHRANE 
al., 
EXPLORATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
RESOURCES, INC., et 
Defendants. 
RULING ANr ORDER 
CASE NO. 050800069 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants, 
filed September 28, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memoran-
dum. The Defendants have each filed respective memoranda in op-
position to the motion. The Plaintiff has filed reply memoranda 
in support of the motion. Having reviewed the matter, and hav-
ing received a notice to submit the motion for decision, the 
Court now rules upon the motion. 
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the 
trial court discretion to revise pre-final-judgment orders. In 
this case, the Court will refuse to exercise its discretion to 
revise the order for the following reasons. 
First, for all intents and purposes, the Court's order 
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff was a final judgment on the Plaintiff's claims. 
Second, the Court is not convinced that granting the Defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment was in error. In this case, 
the Plaintiff's only shred of evidence supporting ownership of 
the pipeline was an assignment transferring whatever interests 
Mr. Gilmore had in the Subject Pipeline to the Plaintiff. The 
Court acknowledges that this document was before the Court for 
consideration relating to the motions for summary judgment. 
What was not before the Court, however, was any evidence regard-
ing what interests Mr. Gilmore had in the subject pipeline prior 
to that assignment. Mr. Gilmore baldly asserted that Gilmore 
received title to the Pipeline from Bonanza by unrecorded as-
signment. Aff. William Gilmore, 53. At deposition on October 
03, 2005, Mr. Gilmore testified that he had a copy of the unre-
corded assignment from Bonanza to Gilmore and that he would pro-
duce a copy of that document. Production of tax documents indi-
cating ownership were also promised at that time. None of these 
documents were ever produced (even though all of them should 
have been produced as part of initial disclosures). Repeated 
requests for production of ownership documents were made by the 
Defendants. Nothing was provided. Therefore, the only evidence 
proffered on the issue of ownership was the assignment from Gil-
more to Weststar. The Court, in granting the Defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment, ruled that, as a matter of law, such 
evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Tf 
the Plaintiff feels that the decision was in error, the correct 
course of action for the Plaintiff is not to file a motion for 
reconsideration, but rather to file an appeal. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of sjppl^' , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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"You testified that each of them still 
have an i n t e r e s t in the pip e l i n e , " referring to 
Collins and W a r e ? 
"That is right. 
"So Westar owns the p i p e l i n e " -- I'm on 
page 142 st a r t i n g at line II for the record. "So 
Westar owns the pipeline minus 8 point whatever 
percent it is that each of those own? 
" Y e s . " 
This is my questions, Mi . Gilmore's 
answn r > . 
"So they own what? 
"ANSWER: I assigned whit interest I had. 
"QUESTION: What you had, but you didn't 
sign for them? 
"ANSWER: No. 
"QUESTION: Do you p u r p o r t t o r e p r e s e n t 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h i s l a w s u i t ? 
"ANSWER: No. 
"Are you purporting to collect damages on 
their behalf as co-owners or interest owners in the 
pi peli ne? 
"ANSWER: That is a matter and subject 
that I hadn't given any consideration to. 
"QUESTION: That is why I ask. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
10 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. When did that entity go out of business? 
3 A. I would say in probably 1997. 
4 Q. And again between this 1979 and now say 1979 time 
5 period did you form any other business entities besides Gilmore 
6 Oil and Gas? 
7 A. I had a partnership I put together called Bonanza Gas 
8 Company. 
9 Q. And when did you put that together? 
10 A. In the early 90' s. 
11 Q. And where was that based? 
12 A. Midland, Texas. 
13 Q. And what was your title in that company? 
14 A. Oh, owner I guess. 
15 Q. I guess I should have asked and the earlier questions 
16 would be is that partnership still in existence? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. When did that go out of business? 
19 A. It had been in existence since, I don't really remember 
20 but it just kind of died. I am going to say probably in the 
21 middle 90!s, 1997, 1998 possibly. 
22 Q. And you said it was a partnership and were their 
23 partners of yours? 
24 A. There were yes. 
25 Q. How many? 
11 
1 A Oh, there was probably seven or eight. 
2 Q. And were those partners companies or individuals or 
3 both? 
4 Both. 
^ Q
 W a s ^ t a iimited partnership such that you were the 
6 general partner? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q, What was the difference, if there wa s any :i n business 
9 operations between Gilmore Oil and Gas and Bonanza Gas Company? 
10 A. What was the difference? 
11 Q. Yes, I mean you were operating both of them, at roughly 
12 the same time so I am just wondering what the difference was, 
13 if any, between those entities? 
14 A. Well, Gilmore Oil and Gas was the operator of oil and 
15 gas properties and wel In. and Bonanza Gas was the operator of 
16 a natural gas pipeline. 
17 Q. Okay. I will come back to that and again in this time 
18 period between when you formed Gilmore Oil and Gas and Bonai iza 
19 Gas Company and ended it, it sounds like both of them ended 
20 roughly the same time 199 7 to -1998 is that : lot tin ie? 
21 A. Roughly I would say. 
22 Q. A ny other business entities that you formed and ran 
23 during that time period this 1979 to 1997 
24 • A No. 
25 Q. Okay. I want to just get these initial questions and 
13 
1 Gas and you said it was a operator of oil and gas wells. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. You said it was a dba, were you the owner and principal 
4 or head of Gilmore Oil and Gas? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Did you have any employees at any time? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Was it always a sole proprietorship throughout its 
9 existence? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Where were the oil and gas wells that it operated? 
12 A. Operated in Texas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming and 
13 Utah. 
14 Q. And did Gilmore Oil and Gas own any of those oil and 
15 gas wells as well as operate them? 
16 A. Oh yes. 
17 Q. Did it own all of them as well as operate them? 
18 A. What do you mean did it own? 
19 Q. Well, I am just wondering if Gilmore Oil and Gas was 
20 the owner of all of the oil and gas wells it operated? 
21 A. Well, if wasn't a hundred percent owner, it was a 
22 certain working interest percentage ownership varying from 
23 twenty-five to hundred percent. 
24 Q. How about Bonanza where you said Bonanza was the 
25 operator of a natural gas pipeline, first of all I guess the 
14 
1 question is where was that pipeline? 
2 A. There was one in Prexus County, Texas and one in Uintah 
3 County, Utah. 
4 Q. Ami ii'ii thr-' on 12 y o u 31 J "? 1: r e f e r e n c e d ,11 n U i n t a h C o u n t y 
5 t h e one we a r e t a l k i n g about i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n or a d i f f e r e n t 
6 one? 
7 A. Well, we haven't described what we are talking about 
8 yet and if you want to describe it I will tell you. 
9 Q Sure, I will be 1 lappy to In y our complaint you talk 
10 about in paragraph seven you reference a natural gas pipeline 
11 a 'asernent :i ii the Nor t:I :i. B o 11 a n z a F:it e ] c:i t o t:a 1 1 e 11 gth 
12 approximately eight miles then you have various section, tract 
13 and range identification numbers. Is that the one that you 
14 are talking about? 
15 
16 Q 1 ijhl arid W e s t S t a i : Elxploi.atiun y o u s a i d thcit y o u 
17 formed in in the year 2000. When you formed it, can you tell 
18 me who the officers were at that time? 
19 A I guess I held all the offices. William C. Gilmore. 
20 Q And did that change at. any time between when you formed 
21 .ii. in the year 2 000 to tl: le present as far as who the officers 
22 have been? 
23 A. Mo. 
24 Q, Again the question going to when the corporation was 
25 formed in 2 000 who were the directors at that time? 
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1 A. I was the sole director. 
2 Q. And still today? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. No other directors in the intervening five years? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. And shareholders when you formed it? 
7 A. Do I have to answer that? 
8 MR. SAM: I think it is probably relevant. 
9 MR. ORITT: I can give a little foundation that would 
10 make Mr. Gilmore feel a little better about that. 
11 THE WITNESS: I own all the shares, hundred percent. 
12 BY MR. ORITT: 
13 Q. When you formed it you owned hundred percent? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Has that stayed the same up through the present? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Where that comes from Mr. Gilmore just for your 
18 interest in paragraph ten of your complaint you say you are the 
19 president and controlling shareholder the plaintiff is WestStar 
20 and that is where it comes from. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. I meant to ask you going back to Bonanza Oil and Gas 
23 you said that there were seven or eight other partners and I am 
24 wondering if you can list for me those that you recall? 
25 A. Marall Inc., Eddy Refining and several other 
16 
1 individuals. 
2 Q. Do you remember any names? 
3 A. Peter Wareing. Harry Phillips and a couple of others 
4 and I dmi'l: remember who they are. 
5 Q. As far as you know WestStar, still a Nevada Corporation 
6 is that right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. It is in good standing? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q. And registered to do business in Utah? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Who is Donald Merritt? 
13 A. Donald Merritt was a corporation nominee for WestStar 
•14' •'. whenever the paperwork "was initiated. 
15 Q. He is not a director and does not hold any titles? 
16 A. 
17 Q. The reason I ask is that at least in the Utah 
18 Department of Commerce web site he is listed as 
19 President/secretary, treasurer and vice president. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q, But /hat is not correct? 
22 A. Well, I think that the way this company that does the 
23 corporation filings they use his name .ominee. 
24 Q, All right, you are listed as a director but nothing 
25 other than that and that is why I asked. 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Can I just now for ease of reference refer to it as the 
3 pipeline that we will be talking about that eight mile pipeline 
4 that is at issue in this litigation. If I call it the pipeline 
5 would that be okay with you that is what we are talking about? 
6 A. When I becomes not okay I will tell you. 
7 Q. That is great that is all I can ask. So you say that 
8 WestStar is the current owner of the pipeline and in my 
9 interrogatories I asked what is the evidence of that, what is 
10 the facts supporting that and you referenced documents 
11 attached at Exhibit A. Well, Exhibit A to your answers were the 
12 assignments that we just looked at, actually the only document. 
13 So my first question is do you have any other 
14 documentation in your files at your office or wherever you keep 
15 files of the chronological history of the ownership of the 
16 pipeline that is at issue in this litigation other than this 
17 assignment of lease? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What are the source of documents you have? 
20 A. I have an unrecorded assignment from Bonanza to William 
21 C. Gilmore and an unrecorded assignment from William C. Gilmore 
22 to WestStar. 
23 Q. Lets start with the Bonanza one. Why is it unrecorded? 
24 A. Just never got it recorded. 
25 Q. And what does that assignment reference, what is being 
1 assigned? 
2 A. Reference to the pipeline. 
3 Q. Just the pipeline not oil and gas leases? 
4 A Thai1 is correct. The pipeline,, the right of-way and 
5 whatever equipment that was associated with it. It describes 
6 the pipeline as OTID type material, length, location. 
7 Q What is your recollection of the date of that 
8 assignment? 
9 . 05. 
10 Q. Oh, the assignment from Bonanza. 
11 A. Affective earlier and I can't remember what the date 
12 is. 
13 Q. So it is dated in this year but retroactive to some 
14 : date? 
15 :hat is right. 
16 ' were to ask your attorney t ::> get n,s a copy of 
17 that you would be able to get your hands on that at some point? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q. All right, so that is that unrecorded assignment and 
20 similarly you said an unrecorded assignment from you to 
21 WestStar? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Of the same pipeline right-of-way, etc? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Agaxn dated 2005 but retroactive? 
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1 A. It is my understanding that he took on all of the 
2 obligations that I had. 
3 Q. That Gilmore had? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. He was the operator. He stepped in my shoes and he was 
7 by that I mean he was a custodian, if you will, and had full 
8 care and custody of operations of all the properties which 
9 included ten wells and six different oil and gas leases. He had 
10 responsibilities that the operator had reporting to State and 
11 Federal Government, producing the wells, keeping in compliance 
12 with the regulations MMS and BLM regulations. Payment of 
13 expenses incurred. Maybe I have said reporting to the parties 
14 involved as far as expenses and production revenue reporting or 
15 any unusual circumstances. There is a thousand things at lease 
16 that a operator is responsible for doing and Mr. Allen had been 
17 an operator for a number of years. It is my understanding that 
18 he is a petroleum engineer and he operates properties nearby 
19 here. 
20 When he first started operating he operated a number of 
21 wells in Cowley Basin Field which later was unitized and the 
22 unit operator was Inland Production I think, Inland 
23 something, Inland Resources, Inland Production or Inland 
24 something. Under those circumstances he relinquished 
25 operations on the wells he formally operated to the unit 
1 operator. Outside of that, he had at least one. other well that 
2 he operated nearby that was not in that unit. I believe it is 
3 called the Federal 14-18 that he was the operator and had some 
4 working interest in. That well too was a recipient of gas run 
5 through this whole pipeline system and he is a beneficiary of 
6 that as was the QEP Well but those two wells I don't think we 
7 in units but I may be wrong about the QEP Well but I don't 
8 think that well is in units kind of an outlying well in a unit. 
9 Q. Okay. You listed several items that he was to operate, 
10 did it include the pipeline that we are talking about in this 
11 lawsuit? 
12 A. Did what? 
13 Q. His duties as operator include the pipel ine that we are 
14 talking about in this lawsuit? 
15 A. He is charged with the responsibility of producing 
16 and selling the oil and gas from the properties. 
17 Q. Are you telling me that his duties as operator 
18 included that pipeline? 
19 A. Well, he had a duty to sell the gas and produce and 
20 sell gas which came along with the oil and that pipeline was 
21 there and available for that and he did some of that is my 
22 under s tanding. 
23 Q. Is there a court order in this lawsuit in Texas that 
24 appoints Cochrane as operator? 
25 A. There was yes. 
1 Q. Do you have a copy of that order? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Can you get that and provide that to Mr. Sam? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Is there an order ever releasing Cochrane as operator? 
6 A. The order had a time limit on it. 
7 Q. Do you know what that time limit was? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Do you know if that time limit has expired? 
10 A. I am sure that it has. Excuse me and part of the 
11 responsibilities and obligations of Ken Allen and Cochrane 
12 Resources were to take care of the properties and he charged 
13 some healthy fees to do so. 
14 Q. Did he have an obligation to report to the court? 
15 A. No, not to my knowledge. 
16 Q. Did he provide reports to you? 
17 A. Not what I requested. 
18 Q. But did he provide reports to you and maybe not what 
19 you requested but were you provided reports or other 
20 information? 
21 A. Well, I requested that he provide me with certain 
22 information and he did not do so. 
23 Q. My question was did he provide you information or some 
24 kind or reporting that wasn't what you asked for but did he 
25 provide you stuff? 
1 A. That is my recollection but it is beyond my legal 
2 comprehension to answer that. I don't know. A lot of water 
3 went under the bridge before this ever happened as it relates 
4 to Mr. Cochrane or Mr. Ken Allen and Cochrane Resources. 
5 Q. Before this was signed a lot did? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You organized WestStar Exploration sometime in the 
8 year was it 2000? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Do you recall exactly when in 2000? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Can you get us the articles of incorporation showing 
13 that? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Have you been the sole shareholder from the day of its 
16 inception? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Now you talked a little bit about a company called 
19 Bonanza Oil? 
20 A. No, I didn't. 
21 Q. Or Bonanza what did you call it, Bonanza Gas Company? 
22 A. That is right. 
23 Q. Now is that a partnership or a corporation? 
24 A. Partnership. 
25 Q. Is there some reason it is registered with the State 
1 of Utah as a corporation? 
2 A. It may have been. 
3 Q. But it is your position it is a partnership? 
4 A. Well, it was either a corporation and a partnership 
5 or a partnership I don't remember. 
6 Q. When was it organized? 
7 A. In the early 90fs. 
8 Q. And what was your position with it? 
9 A. Owner, president. 
10 Q. I guess in the partnership you have been a partner 
11 with others? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And you earlier said that there was seven or eight 
14 others and you gave names of part of those? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. The corporation then you would be a shareholder and. 
17 the people you named would be the other shareholders? 
18 A. No, there is never any shareholders. I don't remember 
19 if it was a corporation or not and maybe it was but if it was 
20 Bonanza Gas I was the only owner in it. 
21 Q. Well what were these other folks then? 
22 A. The corporation may have been the general partner in 
23 the partnership. I honestly don't remember. 
24 Q. What ever happened to Bonanza Gas Company? 
25 A. It just disappeared. 
1 Q. What do you mean it disappeared? 
2 A. It hasn't existed for a long time and nothing happened 
3 about it and probably wasn't done properly wold be my guess . 
4 Q. You just quit operating it? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Didn't do anything formally to dissolve i t ? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. What was owned by Bonanza Gas Company? 
9 A. Well, in Utah it owned this pipeline. 
10 Q. Anything else? 
11 A. It owns another pipeline in Texas. 
12 Q. Then you said or I recall your testimony that there is 
13 an unrecorded assignment from Bonanza Gas to you of this 
14 pipeline? 
15 A. That is right. 
16 Q. And that happened in 2005? 
17 A. Affective date was several years earlier than that. 
18 Q. But you signed it in 2005? 
19 A. That is right. 
20 Q. How did we determine an affective date? 
21 A. I don't recall how it was determined. 
22 Q. Who determined it? 
23 A. I did. 
24 Q. You don't know how you determined it? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Did you get any corporate authorization to transfer 
2 that asset from Bonanza Gas to you? 
3 A. Well, I guess I got it yes. 
4 Q. Tell me what you got. 
5 A. Just got it from me. 
6 Q. You just decided to do it? 
7 A. That is right. I didn't have any other stockholders. 
8 Q. Did you pay Bonanza Gas anything for it? 
9 A. I don't remember. 
10 Q. It just happened within the year. 
11 A . I don't remember. 
12 Q. So my understanding is that Bonanza Gas built the 
13 pipeline and sometime in 2005 signed a document signing it to 
14 you and then you signed it to Weststar? 
15 A. That is right. 
16 Q. And then you picked retroactive affective dates? 
17 A. That is right. The paperwork should have been done 
18 long ago. 
19 Q. What is BLM's involvement with this pipeline? 
20 A. Well, a lot of the right-of-way is on BLM surface and 
21 the right-of-way application was reviewed and approved by 
22 BLM and there are certain, I believe they are called rental 
23 payments that are made periodically for the continuation of 
24 the right-of-way permits. They have over site any other matter 
25 that would involve that line on their surface as to anything 
1 money from me. He took all that revenue and it wasn't his. H-B 
2 spent a hundred and thirty thousand dollars fixing up messes 
3 that he caused he and/or his insurance company ought to be 
4 paying for it not me. 
5 Q. Anything else you claim that he did fraudulently? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. You also claim that he acted illegally. Anything other 
8 than what you have already told us to support your claim that 
9 he acted illegally? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. You also claim that he acted without authority. 
12 Anything other than what you have told us that would show that 
13 he acted without authority? 
14 A. No. In his own handwriting he wrote a letter on a 
15 yellow tablet paper said that he and the parties involved 
16 decided to use this pipeline rather than let it sit. I am sure 
17 you have a copy of that. I actually have the original so you 
18 don't have the original, I have it. 
19 Q. Okay, anything else? 
20 A. Nothing that I know. I hope to find out more as we 
21 take further depositions. 
22 Q. During this entire time period he was acting under the 
23 direction as operator under the direction of the court out of 
24 Texas according to your testimony? 
25 A. That is right. 
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1 as far as he is concerned. 
2 Q. You claim that he stole money from you? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Houston Exploration Company, do you own an interest 
5 in that company? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. It owns a half interest in this pipeline? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Does it also have a half interest in any damages to the 
10 pipeline or use of the pipeline? 
11 A. I hadn't thought about it. 
12 Q. They probably are an essential party aren't they? 
13 A. I think most of the damages incurred were prior to 
14 their ownership of it and I think equitably if they are due any 
15 money it would be any damages incurred after they acquired 
16 ownership. I don't know exactly what our documents say about 
17 that. At the time this was done I don't think I had any idea 
18 about what was actually happening. 
19 Q. As of March 1, 2004 now that is the affective date of 
20 your agreement with or your assignment with Houston 
21 Exploration? 
22 A. I think that is right. 
23 Q. As half owner of the pipeline that entity be entitled 
24 to half of the damages if any after that date would that be 
25 accurate? 
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1 do with it? 
2 A. I have some plans yes. 
3 Q. What are those plans? 
4 A. They are proprietary. 
5 Q. What are those plans? I am not going to dance with you 
6 and you can talk to your attorney but when I ask a question I 
7 expect it to be answered okay. 
8 A. The plans are for future use of it to market gas. 
9 Q. From your Gilmore wells? 
10 A. Maybe and maybe from other wells. These wells, maybe 
11 my wells and maybe some one else's wells. 
12 Q. Now we have talked about a Ted Collins, he is in these 
13 lawsuits with you? 
14^  A. That is right. 
15 Q. And he is a part owner of what you call the Gilmore 
16 Wells? 
17 A. That is right. 
18 Q. Does he have any ownership interest in the pipeline? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What is his ownership interest? 
21 A. 8.33 percent. 
22 Q. What about the Ware does he have an interest in the 
23 pipeline too? 
24 A. Same percentage. 
25 Q. Do they still have that percentage ownership in the 
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1 don't have a well out there. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. That to me made me suspect and that was part of his 
4 area and he probably ought to know and probably did know there 
5 was a well out there and it was just fishy I thought. 
6 Then his boy Mike Alexander in an effort to work out some 
7 kind of agreement for Questar to use my line and transport gas 
8 from newly drilled wells which I was in agreement to do. I want 
9 to be a good neighbor, he indicated that there were gas 
10 purchase agreements between Inland and Shenandoah and between 
11 Questar and Shenandoah and I guess P&M never did have an 
12 agreement with Questar. They may have assumed one but I don't 
13 know. He told me they were there but he couldn't let me see 
14 them. I don't know if they are there but I bet they are. 
15 Q. Okay. I don't have any other questions right now. 
16 EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. ALLRED: 
18 Q. I have three little areas that I want to clarify and 
19 make sure my notes are right on the ownership of the pipeline. 
20 A guy named Ware and I guess it is an estate now owns 8.33 
21 percent? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And Collins owns 8.33 percent? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And Houston Exploration has 50 percent under the 
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1 document that we have seon? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. So that means WestStar owns forty three and a third 
4 percent? 
5 A. That is right. 
6 MR. SAM: Can I interject something. I thought his 
7 prior testimony was that Ware and Collins combined owned 8.33 
8 percent but they each own 8.33 percent? 
9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
10 MR. SAM: I am sorry. 
11 BY MR. ALLRED: 
12 Q. On the bankruptcy plan Gilmore and you I guess got the 
13 properties out of the Chapter 11 subject to the debt of the 
14 bank? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. I think now I understand how that works. So that just 
17 left the unsecured creditors sitting there and there was no 
18 equity, nothing left, it just went through seven and discharged 
19 them? 
20 A. That is correct. 
21 Q. You indicated that you talked to Ed Neibauer and Jerry 
22 Cowley about the pipeline and they didn't ignore you did they? 
23 A. Well, they didn't ignore me but they didn't continue 
24 to use the pipeline. 
25 Q. And didn't they negotiate back and forth with you about 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
QWEST CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, an 
interlocal cooperative governmental agency; 
the CITY OF RIVERTON, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and TETRA TECH 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES INC., a 
Colorado corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS UTOPIA'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS AND DENYING 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 2:05-CV-00471 PGC 
In this lawsuit, plaintiff Qwest Corporation claims that 47 U.S.C. § 253, the Federal 
Telecommunications Act ("FTA"), preempts Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) and Article XIII, § 
3 of the Utah Constitution because they extend tax-exempt status to defendant UTOPIA and 
thereby allow UTOPIA to offer telecommunications services at low prices. Defendant UTOPIA 
has filed six counterclaims against Qwest. Five of these (numbers one through four and seven) 
relate to Qwest's alleged failure to give UTOPIA access to its essential telecommunications 
Case 2:05-cv-00471-PGC Document 124 Filed 07/18/2006 Page 2 of 13 
infrastructure as the FTA and Utah's Public Telecommunications Law ("PTL") require. The 
remaining counterclaim (number six) is a tort claim for alleged interference with economic 
relations. 
Qwest has moved to dismiss UTOPIA'S five statutory counterclaims (numbered one 
through four and seven) that involve access to its infrastructure. It raises two separate arguments 
in favor of dismissal: first, that UTOPIA fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 
and second, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these causes of action. The court 
will address Qwest's subject matter jurisdiction arguments before its Rule 12(b)(6) arguments 
because a Rule 12(b)(6) "disposition is a decision on the merits"1 that can be entered only by a 
court with subject matter jurisdiction.2 
Qwest has also filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to its trespass claim. The 
court will address this motion after resolving the motion to dismiss. 
I. What Are UTOPIA'S Causes of Action? 
To determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the court must first discern which 
statutes give rise to UTOPIA'S counterclaims. UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims allege that 
Qwest's actions were "[c]ontrary to the provisions of the FTA" or "the provisions of the PTL"3 
without stating which specific provisions Qwest allegedly violated. This court must therefore 
xOsborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 617 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186,200(1962)). 
2Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Frederiksen v. City ofLockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
3Doc. No. 4 7 , ^ 2 2 , 2 7 , 32, 38. 
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Case 2:05-cv-00471-PGC Document 124 Filed 07/18/2006 Page 3 of 13 
determine the specific subsections of the FTA or PTL under which UTOPIA'S causes of action 
arise. 
Counterclaims one through four allege that UTOPIA, while constructing its network, 
"requested access to certain of Qwest's essential facilities" and that "Qwest failed to permit 
UTOPIA to have reasonable access to its essential facilities."4 Based on this language, Qwest 
argues that UTOPIA'S counterclaims arise under 47 U.S.C. § 224, the Pole Attachment Act 
("PAA"). The PAA requires the FCC to "regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole 
attachments."5 Access to poles appears to be a "term" or "condition" subject to FCC regulation 
under § 224(b); Qwest's argument thus appears to be correct. 
But as Qwest further notes, one subsection of the PAA, 47 U.S.C. § 224(c), expressly 
provides for state law preemption — that is, when a state chooses to regulate "with respect to 
rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way," the state's 
regulations preempt any equivalent FCC requirements.6 Utah has certified to the FCC that it has 
enacted legislation and adopted regulations pursuant to § 224(c).7 Contrary to the position 
asserted by UTOPIA, these regulations were in effect at all times relevant to this litigation. And 
as the Utah Supreme Court noted, the broad language of § 224(c) means that "any regulation of 
"See Doc. No. 47, HH 21-22, 26-27, 31-32, 37-38. 
547 U.S.C. § 224(b). 
6/</.§ 224(c)(1). 
States that Have Certified that They Regulate Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.R. 1498, 1498 
(1992); see also Utah Cable Television Operators Ass 'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm 7J, 656 P.2d 398, 
402 (Utah 1982). 
-3-
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utility pole attachment contracts by a state, regardless of the nature or specificity of such 
regulation, negates FCC jurisdiction over contracts in that state by providing a state forum for 
complaints concerning such contracts."8 As such, Utah regulations — not FCC regulations — 
govern disputes "with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, 
and rights-of-way," even though some pre-2006 Utah regulations specifically mention only pole 
attachments by cable television companies. 
In opposition, UTOPIA argues that its counterclaims are "not based specifically on § 224 
but upon the Federal Telecommunications Act as a whole."9 UTOPIA cites no case law in 
support of this proposition — that a private party may enforce "the entire FTA" or that the FTA 
"as a whole" creates an implied right of action. Rather, UTOPIA cites 47 U.S.C. §§ 206-07 and 
251, and claims that these sections, read in light of § 224, create private rights of action. 
The court cannot accept UTOPIA'S argument. The few cases the court found that deal 
with this issue hold that § 251 does not create a private right of action.10 Most courts to address 
the issue have also held that § 207 does not create a private right of action for violations of the 
%Utah Cable Television Operators Ass 'n, 656 P.2d at 400. 
9Doc. 81,at6n.4. 
™AT&T Communications ofCal, Inc v. Pacific Bell, 60 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.11 In short, the great weight of authority demonstrates that 
there is no private right of action for violations of the 1996 Act. 
Accordingly, the court agrees with Qwest and holds that UTOPIA'S first four 
counterclaims are pole attachment claims that arise under the PTL — the preemptive provisions 
of Utah law. 
II. Does This Court Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction over UTOPIA'S First 
Four Counterclaims? 
Now that court has determined UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims arise under the PTL, 
the court must next address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court 
holds that it does not have jurisdiction. 
Under the PTL, "a dispute over interconnection of essential facilities . . . or the planning 
or provisioning of facilities or unbundled elements" should be brought "to the [Utah Public 
Service] commission, and the commission, by order, shall resolve the dispute on an expedited 
basis."12 Utah law requires parties to "'exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review.'"13 There is no dispute that UTOPIA filed its 
counterclaims without first seeking redress from the PSC as Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e) 
11
 See Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 173 F. 
Supp. 2d 1282, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2000); see also Global Naps, Inc v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, 
Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 n.17 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing cases). But see Conboy v. AT&T Corp., 
84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N. Y. 2000) (finding that a private right of action exists based on 
"Sections 206 and 207 of the Telecommunications Act for damages suffered as a result of a 
violation of the Act"). 
12Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e). 
"Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, 727 (Utah 2002) (quoting Nebeker v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 34 P.3d 180, 184 (Utah 2001)). 
-5-
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provides. Because "this precondition to suit" was not satisfied, this court "lack[s] subject matter 
jurisdiction."14 
UTOPIA argues that it need not exhaust its administrative remedies. It claims that the 
PSC lacks jurisdiction over it because UTOPIA is a municipal corporation. This argument is not 
well founded. The issue is whether the PSC has jurisdiction over Qwest so that it may adjudicate 
any grievances against Qwest. During the hearing on this motion, all parties admitted that the 
PSC has such jurisdiction; a plain reading of the PSC's jurisdictional statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-1, shows that admission was correct. UTOPIA has not pointed to any statute that would 
exempt it from the requirement of submitting its disputes with Qwest — a party over whom the 
PSC has jurisdiction — to that administrative body. 
Whether the PSC has jurisdiction to adjudicate Qwest-initiated proceedings against 
UTOPIA is another question that the court need not reach. The plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e) requires UTOPIA, "one . . . of the disputing parties" in this 
interconnection melee, to "bring the dispute" against Qwest "to the commission" so that "the 
commission, by order," may "resolve the dispute on an expedited basis." 
UTOPIA also appears to argue that the PSC lacks jurisdiction over it as a complaining 
party because it is a municipal corporation. This argument is based on the so-called "ripper 
clause" of the Utah Constitution, which provides: "The legislature shall not delegate to any 
AId. 
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special commission . . . any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal 
improvement, money, property or effects . . . or to perform any municipal function."15 
On its face, this clause does not appear to apply here. If UTOPIA were to initiate 
proceedings against Qwest before the PSC for Qwest's failure to provide access to facilities, the 
commission's decision would not be "interfering] with any municipal improvement, money, 
property or effects," but with Qwest's "improvements, money, property, or effects." 
If this clause does apply, however, two elements must be met before it would deprive the 
PSC of jurisdiction over UTOPIA as a complaining party: first, the PSC must be a "special 
commission"; and second, UTOPIA must be performing a "municipal function." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the PSC is a special commission for Ripper Clause purposes,16 thus 
satisfying the first element. But based on the 1990 Utah Supreme Court case of Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, UTOPIA cannot prove that it is 
performing a "municipal function." 
In UAMPS, the Utah Supreme Court set forth this "balancing approach to decide whether 
any particular activity is a 'municipal function.'"17 Courts must consider factors such as 
the relative abilities of the state an municipal governments to perform the 
function, the degree to which the performance of the function affects the interests 
of those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the extent to which the 
legislation under attack will intrude upon the ability of the people within the 
15Utah Const, art. VI, §28. 
]6Utah Assoc. Mun. Power Sys. v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 789 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990). 
11
 Id. at 302 (quotation marks omitted). 
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municipality to control through their elected officials the substantive policies that 
affect them uniquely.18 
Based on these factors, the UAMPS court held that an effort by a consortium of municipalities to 
build a power transmission line was not a "municipal function."19 UAMPS was "a political 
subdivision of the state that combine[d] more than twenty cities, towns, and local agencies for 
the purpose of generating, buying, and selling electricity across the state."20 Its construction of a 
power line was "sufficiently infused with a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, interest to 
escape characterization as a municipal function."21 And "the very fact" that so many 
municipalities banded together to form UAMPS went "a long way to demonstrate that the 
function is one beyond the ability of any local government entity to perform effectively."22 
The only real difference the court can see between the facts in UAMPS and those here is 
that UTOPIA is building a telecommunications network rather than a power transmission line. 
Otherwise, the discussion in UAMPS is applicable in all material respects to this case. The court 
therefore holds that UTOPIA is not performing a "municipal function" within the meaning of 
article VI, § 28 of the Utah Constitution by constructing its telecommunications infrastructure. 
The "ripper clause" therefore does not preclude the PSC from exercising jurisdiction over 
UTOPIA, which must present its pole attachment claims to the PSC before bringing suit. In light 
nId. 
l9Id. 
2Hd. 
21Id. at 303 (brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
22Id. 
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of this conclusion, the court need not reach any of Qwest's other arguments, including its 
argument that UTOPIA cannot claim sovereign immunity under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
III. UTOPIA'S Seventh Counterclaim Must Also Be Dismissed. 
UTOPIA'S final counterclaim (mislabeled number 7) alleges that Qwest breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In full, this cause of action reads: 
45. UTOPIA incorporates all preceding paragraphs herein. 
46. Qwest is required to permit UTOPIA to have reasonable access to its 
essential facilities. 
47. Such required access includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
48. Contrary to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Qwest has 
not provided UTOPIA reasonable access to its essential facilities. 
49. As a direct and proximate result of Qwest's conduct, UTOPIA has 
suffered an undetermined amount of damages which damages shall be 
proven at trial.23 
In moving to dismiss this claim, Qwest argues that UTOPIA has not shown any contract 
that would create an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. UTOPIA responded by stating 
that "[s]uch implied covenant obviously is a part of a contract and therefore the existence of such 
contract is implicit in the allegation."24 While the existence of a contract may be implicit in its 
allegation, UTOPIA stops short of alleging the existence of an explicit contract that gives rise to 
the alleged duty. Instead, it claims that the FTA and PTL "granted statutory contract third-party 
beneficiary status upon UTOPIA because such legislative acts clearly intended to confer a 
Doc. No. 47, at 20. 
Doc. 81, at 12. 
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separate and distinct benefit on UTOPIA (47 U.S.C. § 251) and a means to enforce such benefit 
(47 U.S.C. § 206-207)."25 
The court finds no precedential support for UTOPIA'S claim. UTOPIA did not cite, and 
the court has not found, any case that says § 251 creates a "statutory contract" to which any 
interested party may claim a "third-party beneficiary" status. This is an especially difficult 
argument for UTOPIA to make because, as noted above, § 251 does not even create an implied 
private right of action.26 UTOPIA'S seventh counterclaim therefore should be dismissed. 
One final question remains: should the dismissal be under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore on 
the merits, or under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction? Arguably, the court 
should dismiss for failure to state a claim because of the apparent lack of support for UTOPIA'S 
position. But the language of this claim — alleging a failure to provide "reasonable access to 
[Qwest's] essential facilities" — is so related to conduct governed by Utah's PTL that the court 
holds it arises under the PTL just like UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims. As such, this claim, 
like the others, must be adjudicated before the PSC, an entity better suited to determining 
whether Utah's regulatory scheme creates an "implied duty of good faith and fair dealing." The 
court therefore dismisses this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
25Id. 
2(iAT&T Communications ofCai, Inc. v. Pacific Bell, 60 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
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IV. Qwest's Fourth Cause of Action Will Be Dismissed Because of Qwest's 
Admissions. 
In its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, Qwest admitted that its fourth 
claim "is premised on UTOPIA'S violation of state and local laws and applicable industry 
standards" and "invokes the expertise and ongoing regulatory function of the commission."27 
Qwest also "agree[d] that this claim should be dismissed."28 The court therefore dismisses 
Qwest's fourth cause of action. 
V. Disputed Issues of Material Fact Preclude the Entry of Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
Qwest also has moved for summary judgment on its trespass claims. It alleges that 
UTOPIA has attached to Qwest's poles without permission and has removed Qwest's facilities 
from poles of unknown or disputed ownership. Qwest asks the court to find as a matter of law 
that UTOPIA trespassed; this finding, it claims, should facilitate settlement of its pending tort 
claims. 
The standard governing summary judgment motions should be familiar. The court may 
only enter summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact."29 "' A fact is "material" if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the 
Doc. #111, at 4. 
'Id. 
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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outcome of the lawsuit.'"30 This court must "view the evidence and draw all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."31 
In this case, the court finds that UTOPIA (and Tetra Tech, its subcontractor) have 
presented evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to who owned some of the 
poles at the time the alleged trespass occurred. Since trespass requires proof of ownership,32 
disputed issues of fact on this point preclude summary judgment at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
The court GRANTS Qwest's motion to dismiss (# 67) and DISMISSES UTOPIA'S first 
through fourth and seventh counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It also 
DISMISSES Qwest's fourth cause of action for the same reason. These claims all relate to "pole 
attachments" and, under Utah's regulatory framework, must first be resolved by the PSC before 
they may be heard in court. 
30Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDNReal Estate Overland Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sports Unlimited, Inc. v. Lankfor Enters., Inc., 275 F.3d 996, 999 (10th Cir. 
2002)). 
3]Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
32See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (citing John 
Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf, Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 
(Utah 1980)). 
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And disputed issues of material fact require the court to DENY Qwest's motion for 
summary judgment (# 98). 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Qi 
Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
QJ 
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Tab I 
IN REPLY REFER TO 
3162.3 
UT08300 
United States Department of the Interior 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
Vernal Field Office 
170 South 500 East 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 781-4400 Fax: (435) 781-4410 http://www.bl rn.gov/utah/ vernal 
T A K E P R I D E " 
' A M E R I C A 
June 8, 2004 
William Gilmore 
Weststar Exploration Company 
811 Rusk, Suite 708 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Re: Well No. Federal 34 No. 1 
NWNW, Sec. 34, T8S, R24E 
Uintah County, Utah 
Lease No. UTU-52767 
Dear Mr. Gilmore: 
This correspondence is in regard to the self-certification statement submitted requesting a 
change in operator for the referenced well. After a review by this office, the change in operator 
request is approved. Effective immediately, Weststar Exploration Co. is responsible for all 
operations performed on the referenced well. All liability will now fall under your bond, BLM 
Bond No. UTB000101, for all operations conducted on the referenced well on the leased land. 
Our records show that a right-of-way, UTU-65139, has been issued for the off lease portion of 
the pipeline to the subject well. In order for Weststar Exploration Co. to obtain the Bureau of 
Land Management's approval for the use of this right-of-way, you must have this right-of-way 
assigned over to Weststar Exploration Co. Please contact Cindy McKee at 435-781 -4434 for 
instructions on how to complete the assignment of the right-of-way. 
If you have any other questions concerning this matter, please contact Leslie Walker of this 
office at (435) 781-4497. 
Sincerely, 
Howard B. CleavingeM 
Assistant Field Manager 
Minerals Resources 
cc: UDOGM 
Ted Collins Jr. 
Herbert W. Ware Jr. 
bcc: Well file U-924 
Reading file 
Lands 
United States Department of the Interior 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
Vernal Field Office 
170 South 500 East 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 781-4400 Fax: (435) 781-4410 
T A K E P R I C 
•NUMERIC 
IN REPLY REFER TO. 
2880/2880 
UTU-65131 et al 
(U-084) 
MAR 1 3 2006 
DECISION 
Assignee: 
Weststar Exploration Co. 
811 Rusk, #708 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Rights-of-Way 
UTU-65131, UTU-65163 
UTU-65158, UTU-65139 
Assignor: 
Gilmore Oil & Gas 
115 N Marieneld #155 
Midland, Texas 79701 
Bonanza Gas Company 
110 N. Marienfeld 155 
Midlan, Texas 79701 
Assignment of Ricrhts-of-Way Approved 
On February 13, 2006, Weststar Exploration Company filed an 
assignment in connection with Federal rights-of-way UTU-
65131, UTU-65163, UTU-65158, and UTU-65139. 
The assignment conveys 100 percent interest in the subject 
rights-of-way from Bonanza Gas Company and Gilmore Oil & Gas 
to Weststar Exploration Company 
It has been determined that the applicant has met the 
requirements of 43 CFR s2807.21 and 2887.11, therefore, the 
assignment are hereby approved, subject to the terms and 
conditions of the original grants, any conditions of 
approval attached to the APDs and/or SNs, and the applicable 
regulations under 43 CFR 2800 and 2880. 
The assignments listed above do not require the preparation 
of an environmental assessment or environmental impact 
statement as it has been found to not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment. The applicable Categorical Exclusion reference 
is in 516 DM 11.5 E.9. This references states, Renewals and 
assignments of leases, permits or rights-of-way where no 
additional rights are conveyed beyond those granted by the 
original authorizations. 
Copies of serial register pages have been enclosed for your 
information and records. 
Please contact Cindy McKee of our office at (435) 781-4434 
if you need additional information concerning this right-of-
way. 
Robert M. Specht 
Branch Chief, Lands & Minerals 
Enclosures: 
As State 
cc: Well Files (33-1, og lease UTU-58725, 26-1 og lease UTU-
52765, 1-27 og lease UTU-54928, 27-2, 27-3 og lease UTU-
52765, 34-1 & 34-2 og lease UTU-52767 
CMcKee;cm;3-3-20O6 
